In the late 19th and early 20th
Century the French and German navies became fixated on the idea of “Cruiser
Warfare” – the individual ships operating far from home on the world’s oceans and
striking at enemy seaborne trade. Britain, with enormous merchant fleet and the
dependence of its economy on overseas trade, was seen as particularly
vulnerable. Belief in the concept rested on the success of such operations in
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars by both privateers and national navies.
As late as the American Civil War, in the 1860s, the Confederate riders Alabama and Florida were to hurt disrupt Union trade far from home waters and
necessitate diversion of significant resources to hunt them down. In the 1890s
so called “protected cruisers”, which would later evolve into the light-cruiser
classification, were seen as especially suited to such tasks.
The French navy
went so far as to build one such cruiser, the Châteaurenault, which was designed to look from a distance like an
ocean liner, and so increase its chances of closing with an unsuspecting
victim. Several classes of German cruisers of the immediate pre-WW1 period were
especially suited to such operations. It was also intended that in time of war
civilian vessels would also be commandeered and armed. Unarmoured they might be,
but they were intended to capture defenceless merchant shipping and not battle
it out with a naval opponent. The Royal Navy, no less than those of other
nations, had made provisions for such conversions and subsidies were often provided
to shipping companies to build strengthened positions into decks on to which
guns could be mounted in wartime. (The RMS Lusitania
was one such vessel, though she was not armed at the time of her loss).
Priinz Eitel Friedrich in peacetime - and a candidate for transformation to ocean raider in times of war |
The weakness of the cruiser warfare concept was that the
conditions that had favoured success in the Napoleonic era no longer applied. Sailing ships could operate far from base for
many months – food and fresh water being the only consumables – but steam
vessels were heavily dependent on shore support, not only for fuel supply but
for maintenance of boiler and machinery. Britain was well supplied with
widely-spread fortified naval bases when war broke out in 1914 but Germany had
only a single such base, Tsingtao, on the Chinese coast. German colonial
harbours elsewhere were unfortified and were thus easily occupied in the early
months of the war. Tsingtao, despite heavy investments in strong fortifications,
was to fall to a combined Japanese –British force before the end of 1914. The
upshot was that German vessels on overseas deployments could not rely on
fuelling and maintenance facilities other than those in Germany itself. Some
reliance had been placed on chartered colliers supplying coal from neutral
ports and rendezvousing with warships at sea but in the event this source
proved of little utility. (Click here to read blog on “Germany’s Naval Nomads”) In practice German raiders were
dependent on coal captured from prizes. In practice, transfer of coal from one
ship to another on the open sea was a brutally difficult task in all but the
calmest weather.
Gunboat SMS Iltis - sister of the Luchs, which gave up her guns to arm the Eitel Friedrich |
Stern view of Prinz Eitel Friedrich - gun just visible on the poop |
The Eitel Friedrich
was to operate in the Pacific for the next three months, hunted, as von Spee’s
squadron was separately by Japanese as well as British forces. Britain’s formal
alliance with Japan – which was to last until 1923 – was paying off and
fulfilling its intended role of releasing British ships from the Pacific area
for employment closer to home. No success was scored by the Eitel Friedrich until early December but
her second capture was invaluable, a French sailing collier carrying 3500 tons
of coal. As this vessel carried no radio it was possible to tow her to the tiny
Chilean possession of Easter Island which was not connected to the mainland by
either telegraph or radio. The Eitel
Friedrich’s presence thus unknown and here the coal could be transferred in
sheltered waters and sheep were also taken on board for meat. The collier – the
first of eight sailing vessels the Eitel
Friedrich would capture – was scuttled after the transfer. The collier’s
crew were put ashore though those of subsequent captures were taken on board,
accommodation being ample.
By this time the Eitel
Friedrich was with one exception – the light cruiser SMS Dresden – the only survivor of van Spee’s
squadron, the others having been hunted down and sunk. Her engines and boilers were
already showing signs of wear and top speed had fallen, and was likely to fall
still further. With no friendly base available there was no option but to head
for Germany, inflicting maximum damage on enemy shipping on the way.
Accordingly, in January 1915, with enough coal and mutton to last until early
April, Captain Therichens brought his ship over into the South Atlantic.
Conscious of the risk of British ships patrolling the Cape Horn area, he steered
a course far to the south, along the northern fringes of Antarctica.
The William P Frye |
Over the next month the Eitel
Friedrich was to sink a further eight ships off the South American coast.
Aware that he was incapable of outrunning any enemy, Therichens stayed away
from the main trade routes and detection of his presence was made all the more
difficult by most smaller merchant ships of the period not carrying radio. His tonnage score was steadily increasing –
reaching before operations ended a total of eleven ships of 33,000 Gross
Registered Tons. One of these victims
was to prove especially significant, the large (3,374-ton) American sailing
vessel William P Frye, detained on 27th
January. It should be noted that the United States was still neutral at this
stage of the war. The Frye was
carrying wheat to Britain and, despite her American registration, Therichens
ordered the entire cargo to be thrown overboard before she would be allowed to
proceed. This process went slowly – and dangerously, for too-long a stay in any
one area increased the risk of interception –
so on the following day Therichens ordered the American crew to be taken
on board the Eitel Friedrich and the
ship herself to be destroyed by gunfire. This was the first case of a neutral
American ship being sunk by the German Navy – actions that were ultimately draw
the United States into war with Germany.
The Prinz Eitel Friedrich arriving at Newport News on 12th March 1915 |
Four further ships – two steamers and two sailing vessels –
were captured and destroyed in February but during the following month it was
obvious that with supplies running low, engines suffering breakdowns, hull
badly fouled and awareness that British patrolling has intensified, the chance
of reaching Germany was all but zero. There was nothing for it but to head for
a neutral port – in this case Newport News in Virginia, arriving there on 12th
January. Therichens seemed to have entertained hopes of being allowed to carry
out major repairs, and the American authorities – bizarrely, one must think –
allowed the captured crews, now amounting to some 300 men, to be kept on board.
Therichens argued, with some success, to be allowed to stay in Newport News for
several weeks to effect repairs, but the sinking of the William P Frye had eroded sympathy and the case was in the process
of growing into a major diplomatic issue. It was obvious at last however that
escape would be impossible, since a British armoured cruiser, HMS Cumberland and a Canadian cruiser HMSCS Niobe, were waiting just outside
territorial waters. (The similarity with the plight of the Graf Spee at Montevideo in 1939, when a later HMS Cumberland was also waiting outside, is
very marked). Accepting defeat, Therichens surrendered his ship and his crew
for internment in America.
The Eitel Friedrich
was to remain idle for the next two years but when the United States entered
the war she was taken over for use as a troopship and renamed USS DeKalb. She was to see intense service carrying troops
across the Atlantic to Europe and equally intense service carrying them back in
1919. Thereafter she was to be sold to the United American Lines Company and
operated on transatlantic service under the name SS Mount Clay. She was laid up
in 1926 and scrapped nine years later.
It was a mundane end for a raider that had evaded capture
with skill and determination for seven
months and had inflicted significant loss on enemy shipping at little cost.
Recently published: Britannia’s Spartan
Author Antoine Vanner
talks about his latest novel, Britannia’s Spartan, in a short video. Click hereto watch it.
Click below for more details for both paperback and Kindle
versions:
The Germans at least still had faith in the concept of Commerce raiders in WWII. Submarines proved to be a better weapon to disrupt allied shipping.
ReplyDeleteAgree, but a few commerce raiders such as the Pinguin and the Atlantis had amazing success. And the Kormoran sank teh Australian light-cruiser Sydney in November 1941, though she too was sunk in the same action.
DeleteThe business of needing coal supplies seems to have been a major factor in the collapse of piracy as well - unless you happen to have a convenient shoreline which will resupply, your lifetime is very limited
ReplyDeleteIt's amazing how little thought was given by the Germans pre-1914 in working out teh realism of coal supply from neutral ports. Some relatively simple table-top wargaming would have highlighted the limitations. (It's particularly ironic given that Wargaming was invented by teh German Army's General Staff - though not by the Navy)
Delete